Guest Authors or Ghost Inventors? Inventorship and Authorship Attribution in Academic Science by Lissoni, Francesco & Montobbio, Fabio (ORCID:0000-0001-9917-2344)
  
 
 
This is an author version of the contribution published on: 
Questa è la versione dell’autore dell’opera: 
 
Francesco Lissoni and Fabio Montobbio. Guest Authors or Ghost Inventors? 
Inventorship and Authorship Attribution in Academic Science. Eval Rev 
0193841X13517234, first published on January 9, 2014 as 
doi:10.1177/0193841X13517234 
 
The definitive version is available at: 
La versione definitiva è disponibile alla URL: 
http://erx.sagepub.com/content/early/recent  
 
 
 
  
 
GUEST AUTHORS OR GHOST INVENTORS? 
INVENTORSHIP AND AUTHORSHIP ATTRIBUTION IN ACADEMIC SCIENCE  ⊗ 
 
Francesco Lissoni1, Fabio Montobbio 2 
 
 
1 GREThA - Université Montesquieu, Bordeaux IV (France) 
2 Dipartimento di Economia e Statistica "Cognetti de Martiis" – Università di Torino (Italy) 
CRIOS, Università “L. Bocconi”, Milan (Italy) 
 
 
francesco.lissoni@u-bordeaux4.fr, fabio.montobbio@unito.it 
 
 
Abstract 
We discuss the concepts of inventorship and authorship in academic science and derive some 
policy implications for the institutional mechanisms allocating scientific credit. Authorship and 
inventorship are the key attribution rights that contribute to a scientist’s reputation. Both of them 
appear to be obsolete because they do not capture the increasing division of labour and 
responsibility typical of contemporary scientific research teams. The social norms that regulate the 
distribution of both of them do not reflect exclusively the relative contribution of each team 
member, but also the members’ relative seniority or status. In the case of inventorship, such social 
norms appear to be as important as the legal norms whose respect is often invoked by technology 
transfer officers. As a result, the informative value of both authorship and inventorship 
attributions may be much more limited than assumed by recent evaluation exercises. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent contributions to the economics of science have been largely based on the notion of 
“scientific credit” as derived from Robert K. Merton’s classic sociological approach (Stephan, 1996; 
Audretsch et al., 2004).  Scientific credit is the reputation bestowed by the academic community 
upon the researcher who contributes significantly to the advancement of knowledge in his or her 
field, and makes that advancement accessible, to the entire community and society at large, 
through one or more scientific publications (Merton, 1957; Dasgupta and David, 1994).  
In a number of disciplines, academic scientists earn scientific credit also through patenting: being 
listed among the inventors of a well-known patent brings engineers, chemists, pharmacologists, 
and molecular biologists not only (highly uncertain) economic returns in the form of licensing fees, 
but also some gains in reputation. Patents are increasingly seen as proofs of the impact and 
creativity of the research conducted with public money, witness the increasing attention paid to 
them by research evaluation efforts1. In addition, recent research in both economics and business 
has highlighted the impressive growth of “academic patenting”, both in the US (Henderson et al., 
1998; Mowery et al., 2004), and in a few European countries (Meyer et al., 2003; Balconi et al., 
2004; Gering and Schmoch, 2003; Saragossi and van Pottelsberghe, 2003; Van Looy et al. 2006; 
Lissoni et al., 2008). “Academic patents” are conventionally defined as patents covering inventions 
by university-employed scientists, and may be owned by the scientists themselves (as it often 
happens in countries whose legal system supports the “professor’s privilege”), their universities 
(as most common in the US), or private and public sponsors of the scientists’ research (as it 
happens most often in Europe). 
When it comes to academic patents, authorship and inventorship do not proceed independently. 
It is often the case that inventions derived from academic research are both patented and 
described in one or more scientific publications. More generally, academic inventors are also 
highly productive scientists who do not feel that patenting stands much in the way of their 
freedom to publish (Azoulay et al., 2007; Breschi et al., 2007; Lissoni, 2008). Both authorship and 
1 This happened both in past and present evaluation programs run by governmental agencies and internally by 
universities. A recent report by the European Commission (EC, 2010) provides many examples of assessment exercises 
in Europe that make use of patents as indicators. For past national evaluation programs see the British Research 
Assessment Exercise or the Italian Valutazione Triennale della Ricerca (RAE, 2008; CIVR, 2006). Patents are also 
important in the forthcoming Research Excellence Framework (http://www.ref.ac.uk/) in Britain and in the Italian 
Evaluation of Research Quality (http://www.anvur.org/). In addition survey data (OECD 2003) show that in many 
countries (e.g. Denmark, Germany, Japan) intellectual property activities of researchers are considered for 
recruitment and affect career promotions and wages. 
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inventorship can be controversial, especially in the case of large research teams. Both are forms of 
intellectual property rights (legal or ‘moral’ rights of attribution, according to international 
conventions2); but both are largely administered on the basis of social norms, rather than strict 
legal rules (Zuckerman, 1968; Fasse, 1992).  
The few existing studies on authorship, largely confined to biomedical sciences, suggest that these 
norms allow for negotiation and power struggles within academic research teams, which may 
result in mis-attributions and omissions (Biagioli et al., 1999). This can be highly prejudicial not 
only for individual scientists, but also for third parties (such as hiring universities and funding 
agencies), which may get unreliable reputation signals from the scientists’ CVs. Some recent legal 
case studies suggest that the same may happen with inventorship (McSherry, 2003; Seymoure, 
2006). These case studies suggest that, when research teams aim both at publishing and 
patenting, even the customary social norms of attribution may fail, in the sense that scientists 
cannot reach a consensus agreement on how to apply them.  
This paper revises critically the literature on inventorship and authorship attribution in academic 
science, including the empirical evidence produced by the authors, and derives some policy 
implications on the institutional mechanisms allocating scientific credit. In particular, we discuss 
the norms which are generally followed by academic scientists for the joint attribution of 
inventorship and authorship rights; and to what extent those norms may be questionable from a 
social welfare perspective. In section 2 we introduce the concepts of co-inventorship and co-
authorship, as they are presented, respectively, in the legal and sociological literature, as well as in 
the “grey” literature of journals’ publication guidelines and technology transfer offices’ 
recommendations to potential academic inventors. We also discuss the relative importance of 
social and legal norms in the allocation of scientific credit. In section 3 we survey the recent 
empirical evidence on the importance of social norms for the attribution of inventorship in teams 
of scientists. Section 4 concludes, derives policy implications providing a plea for recognition of the 
changing realities, the increasing complexity and growing diversity of roles, in the production of 
science and technology. 
2 The two international treaties that matter most in this respect are the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Berne convention. The former is an UN-administered agreement entered into 
force 1976, and it contributes to the International Bill of Rights; its article 11 protects 'the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which [a person] is the author' (UNESCO, 2001). The 
latter is an international treaty for the harmonization of national copyright laws, dating back to 1886 and now 
administered by WIPO, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO, 2008); authors’ moral rights are protected 
by article 6. The interpretation of moral rights, as defined by the Berne convention, is generally much more extensive 
in continental Europe (esp. France) than in the UK and the US (Fernandez-Molina and Pais, 2001; Fisk, 2006). 
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2. Authors and inventors: problems of attribution in large research teams  
Multiple-authored publications are nowadays a common feature of many scientific and technical 
fields, and the average number of authors per publication keeps increasing (Weeks et al., 2004). 
Drenth (1998) estimates that in the biomedical field the mean number of authors per paper has 
increased steadily from 3.21 in 1975 to 4.46 in 1995. Similarly, Levsky et al. (2007) calculate a 23% 
increase from 1995 to 2005. Historians and sociologists of science have explained this trend with 
the changing nature of the scientific work, which is increasingly based on specialization, inter-
disciplinarity, the sharing of data and facilities and closer engagement with commercial activities 
(Katz and Martin, 1997; Hackett, 2005; Jones, 2009). Some have suggested that the growing 
“publish-or-perish” pressure on faculty may induce the latter to trade authorship credits in order 
to keep up their publication record, thus inflating the number of authors per paper (Levsky et al. 
2007). 
The number of multi-invented patents has also increased significantly for quite a few years now 
(Wuchty et al., 2007). However, comparisons with publication data reveal that the average 
number of inventors per patent is well below the average number of authors per publication, even 
for comparable technological and scientific fields (Meyer and Bhattacharya, 2004). One common 
explanation for this difference is that while publications are the realm of academics, patents 
originate mostly from industrial research, funded by business companies and performed by their 
employees. It is then suggested that the proprietary nature of this research forces caution in 
looking for cross-firm collaboration, and in granting to industrial researchers the same freedom of 
choosing research team partners enjoyed by academic scientists. However, differences in the 
number of co-authors and co-inventors can be found also when comparing patent-publication 
pairs, that is patents and publications which originate from the same (academic) research team 
and programme (Ducor, 2000; Murray, 2002). In this case, the only possible explanation for the 
difference is that the qualifying criteria for being considered either an author or an inventor differ, 
or that some differences exist in the established practices of attribution. In what follows, we 
discuss such practices. 
2.1 The social norms of co-authorship 
The main reason of interest for the co-authorship phenomenon lies in the threat it poses to the 
incentive system of academic science, and to the damage it may inflict to its public image. 
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Concerns with the attribution of co-authorship are of two (related) kinds.  
First, “the rapid increase of multi-authored papers [has introduced] ambiguity about the 
respective contributions of the joint authors” (Zuckerman, 1968; p.277 – emphasis is ours Multi-
authorship introduces ambiguity to the extent that it treats all authors as the same, regardless of 
specialization and differences (in intensity) of their contribution. Non-alphabetical name ordering, 
a common practice in several disciplines, may alleviate the problem by highlighting the special role 
of first and last authors; but it conveys little information on the role of middle-authors, it ignores 
the problem of division of labour and specialization, and lends itself to manipulation (see below). 
Second, fears have been expressed over the extent of mis-attribution practices, such as ‘guest’ (or 
‘honorary’) and ‘gift’ authorship, which occur, respectively, when a senior scientist is listed in the 
authors’ by-line of a paper he/she has not contributed to, and a student or a technician are 
rewarded beyond their merits with the inclusion in the author’s by-line. Even worse is the case of 
‘ghost’ authors, who are typically junior scientists that contribute significantly to the published 
research, but are mentioned only in the acknowledgements section of the paper or not mentioned 
altogether (Rennie and Flanagin, 1994). Quantitative accounts of guest and honorary authorship 
are also provided by Flanagin et al. (1998), Hoen et al. (1998) and Mowatt et al. (2002). For 
detailed, interview-based evidence see Laudel (2002). 
Ambiguity makes publications less useful as tools for distributing scientific credit, as it makes it 
impossible, for a reader, a perspective employer, or an evaluation agency, to establish clearly in 
which way and to what extent each co-author contributed to achieving the research results. As for 
mis-attribution, this undermines the credibility of authorship, since it breaks the link between 
actual participation to the research effort, and the attainment of the status of author.  . Both 
contribute to dissociate credit from responsibility, to the extent that not all the listed authors (in a 
few cases none of them) can be held accountable for the ethical integrity of the entire research, 
the soundness of applied methods, and the quality of data (Biagioli, 1998).  
These problems have been proved to be particularly severe in biomedical research, possibly 
because of the great importance of responsibility attribution in that field. As a consequence, the 
International Committee of Medical Journal Editors has published, since 1985, the ‘Uniform 
Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals’. In their latest version, the 
Requirements recommend the following criteria for authorship:  
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“Authorship credit should be based on 1) substantial contributions to conception 
and design, or acquisition of data, or analysis and interpretation of data; 2) 
drafting the article or revising it critically for important intellectual content; and 3) 
final approval of the version to be published […] Acquisition of funding, collection 
of data, or general supervision of the research group, alone, do not justify 
authorship” (ICMJE, 2007).  
At a close look, the Requirements do not appear very restrictive, even though all three have to be 
met. They allow very heterogeneous co-authors to be listed together in the same by-line; for 
example, a scientist who has limited himself to an entrepreneurial role (such as chasing grants, 
“conceiving and designing” the paper, and revising it “critically”) could be listed along with a 
colleague who has carried on most of the work (such as acquiring, analysing and interpreting the 
data, drafting the manuscript, and providing the technical expertise). Despite such latitude, the 
ICMJE Requirements have been largely ignored by the scientific community. For example, Bates et 
al. (2004) find that 60% of 72 articles surveyed in 2002 in the Annals of Internal Medicine and 21% 
of 107 articles in the British Medical Journal have at least one author who does not meet the first 
of ICJME criteria. Similar results have been found by Hwang et al. (2003) for the journal Radiology 
(see also references therein on studies on Lancet and the Dutch Medical Journal).  
Lack of application of the ICMJE requirements is mainly due both to ignorance on the scientists’ 
part (Bhopal et al., 1997) and to lack of enforcement by the journal editors. Authorship attribution 
remains a highly subjective decision, which is negotiated within research teams, according to 
customary rules that differ across disciplines and laboratories, and do not necessary match the 
journals’ guidelines. In addition, researchers’ lack of respect of authorship criteria can be hardly 
detected or sanctioned by the journal editors: when guest or gift authors are added to a 
publication, there is little risk of undermining the scientific validity of the article and the 
reputation that “true” authors may derive from it.  As they stand, the ICMJE requirements are so 
prone to be violated that a few pharmaceutical companies have even managed to publish papers 
produced by internal ghost-writers, but “authored” and submitted by complacent guest authors 
from the academic ranks (Ross et al., 2008, and references therein). 
Faced with such a loss of the informative value of authorship, another organization, the Council of 
Science Editors, set up in 1998 an ‘Authorship Task Force’, which in turn proposed quite radical 
recommendations, now embraced by leading medical journals such as JAMA, Lancet, British 
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Medical Journal, Radiology and Journal of Public Health (Biagioli et al., 1999; Rennie, 1998; 
Hackett, 2005). Authors who publish on those journals are now required to classify their individual 
contributions to the published paper according to a grid proposed by the editor, and to specify 
who among them take responsibility for the integrity of the entire study. More interestingly, 
proponents of this approach stress that in modern science the concept of ‘authorship’ is 
irreparably obsolete, and that ‘contributorship’ should take its place. Contributorship-based 
systems of credit rely on the pre-definition of a number of professional categories or professional 
tasks, which are then used to map each team member’s role in the scientific enterprise. The first 
column of table 1 reports the contribution grid adopted by the journal Radiology, in accordance 
with the recommendations of the Authorship Task Force. Each team member can qualify for more 
than one category and at least one has to be identified in category 1 to assume responsibility for 
the integrity of the study. 
The second column of table 1 reports the three necessary conditions to be met in order to qualify 
as “author” according to the ICMJE guidelines. Note that the concept of contributorship is such 
that credit can be given also to research team members who do not qualify as authors, since they 
meet only one of the ICMJE conditions. On the other hand, the ICMJE conditions fail to mention 
explicitly the problem of responsibility, and fail to give due credit to research team members 
whose contribution may be substantial, but not falling in the category of “authorship”.  
A second-order problem of attribution relates to name-ordering. Although general authorship 
guidelines, such as the ICMJE’s, do not provide mandatory recommendations, two major traditions 
exist in this respect: alphabetical ordering (which is typical, for example, of social sciences) and 
contribution-related ordering, which is most common in the hard sciences and is explicitly 
recommended by some learned societies. Pure seniority-based criteria, according to which senior 
authors are listed last, irrespective of their contribution, are less common but not rare, and often 
used to temper conflicts within the team.  
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Table 1 – Contributorship categories vs. authorship requirements in medical journals 
Contributorship categories (from: 
Radiology) 
Authorship criteria (all to be met; from 
ICMJE) 
1. Guarantors of integrity of entire study 
2. Study concepts 
3. Study design 
4. Literature research 
5. Clinical studies 
6. Experimental studies 
7. Data acquisition 
8. Data analysis/interpretation 
9. Statistical analysis 
10. Manuscript definition of intellectual 
content 
11. Manuscript preparation 
12. Manuscript editing 
13. Manuscript revision/review 
14. Manuscript final version approval 
 
 
 
I. Conception & design or acquisition 
of data or data analysis & 
interpretation 
 
 
II. Draft or critical revision of the 
paper (for important intellectual 
content) 
 
 
III. Final approval of the paper version 
to be published 
Source: Hwang et al. (2003) 
In their study on medical publications, Mowatt et al. (2002) calculate that 76% of by-lines list the 
person contributing primarily to the study first, while only 2% list authors alphabetically. Of the 
remaining 22%, seniority criteria were involved, such as listing the senior author last. Some 
professional societies, the ICMJE among them, explicitly recommend to list authors according to 
their contribution (Rennie and Flanagin, 1994; Drenth, 1998). Zuckerman’s (1968) seminal work on 
Nobel laureates’ authorship practices reveals that name ordering decisions are most often 
delegated to senior investigators, who base their judgement both on contribution and seniority. In 
particular, the Nobel laureates interviewed by Zuckerman (who come from all disciplines) point 
out that precise measurement of relative contributions is impossible, so that a pure contribution-
based ordering effort would produce conflicts within the research teams: ambiguity is necessary 
to temper tensions within the team. 
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This suggests that while the message conveyed by the first and last position in a non-alphabetical 
by-line is relatively unambiguous (the first author being usually the junior scientist who has 
contributed most to the paper; the last being the senior investigator, who runs the lab, chases the 
grants, and sets the research strategy) the same cannot be said for the authors in between. These 
may be either effective contributors to the paper (although less important or more senior ones 
than the first author), but they may also be guest authors of many sorts (such as laboratory 
technicians rewarded for their dedication, or very senior scientists listed as a sign of deference). 
Besides being useful for our research (see below), this discussion of name ordering reveals that 
the latter is of limited help in sustaining the notion of authorship and its usefulness for the 
attribution of scientific credit; in fact, it provides only a mild correction to the misattribution 
problem, and no correction at all to the problem of responsibility.  
2.2 The “Muddy Metaphysics” of Co-Inventorship 
Unlike scientific authorship, inventorship is a legal concept whose violation may have some direct 
economic consequences. In the US, a patent may be declared invalid if the designated inventors’ 
contribution does not match with the legally defined one. In addition, the inventors’ names can be 
changed after a patent is granted only as long as the error was made without deceptive intent. 
This norm applies also to foreign patents, when extended to the US. 
According to section 35 of the US constitution (as amended in 1984), two individuals can be 
designated as inventors on the same patent only if they have worked “jointly” and provided some 
kind of “inventive” contribution (Fasse, 1992, pp. 172-173). Of the two criteria, only the latter can 
be responsible for the eventual exclusion of an author of a scientific paper from the related 
patent. In particular each person named on a patent must have contributed to the conception step 
in the invention (as defined by the claims). Conception is “the formation, in the mind of the 
inventor of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is to be 
applied in practice” (Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.). 
In Europe, even with patents issued by the European Patent Office (EPO), inventorship is 
ultimately defined by the various national legislations. For example, in the United Kingdom the 
term inventor is defined as the "actual deviser of the invention..." and the actual deviser is the 
person(s) who contribute(s) to the novelty or inventive step of the invention (s7-3 Patents Act, 
1977). In Italy, as in many other countries, no specific definition of inventor is provided by legal 
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texts. As a matter of fact, author and inventor coincide, with the latter being simply defined as the 
“author of an invention” (the latter being such only if an inventive step exists); mis-attribution of 
inventorship does not appear to threaten the validity of the patent, but it may cause re-allocation 
of the property rights. 
As a result, criteria for defining inventorship turn out to be more restrictive than those defining 
authorship. Being involved in the conception of the invention is a requirement for inventorship 
that some authors of scientific publications may fail. For example, current interpretations of the 
US law suggest that “merely suggesting a desired result” or “having entrepreneurial involvement” 
do not qualify as inventorship (Fasse 1992, pp. 192ff). For example, a scientist whose contribution 
to a research project was limited to raising funds, conceive the initial experiment, and revising the 
draft paper would qualify as author of a project-related paper (see the ICMJE guidelines we 
described above), but not as inventor of any project-related patent. At the opposite end, 
“following the complete instructions” of a colleague or superior does not qualify anybody as an 
inventor; and joining a research team too late, after its members have conceived the key 
characteristics of the desired invention, may be a reason for exclusion from inventorship. The 
latter cases remind naturally to situations in which a junior scientist or a graduate student may be 
rewarded with authorship for her brilliant assistantship, but not with inventorship (Fasse 1992; 
Seymore 2006). 
Scientific journals often publish papers on inventorship attribution for science-based inventions, 
which are by and large written by consultants and technology transfer offices (Bennett and Biswas, 
1997; Vinarov, 2003;  Hutchins, 2003). These papers aim at setting straight a number of legal 
issues related to inventorship, so that scientists who read them will not extend to inventorship 
attribution the same social norms attached to authorship, thus running the risk of invalidating the 
patent. 
However, both the concept of inventorship and its application are much more controversial than 
may appear from such legal opinions. It is very likely that decisions on inventorship attribution, 
very much like those on authorship, depend heavily upon the discretionary judgement of the most 
senior scientists in the team, who most often manage the economic details of the research 
enterprise and exercise authority, and whose opinion may carry a heavy weight within the team. 
When faced with the difficult task of evaluating their junior colleagues’ contribution towards 
obtaining some research results, these scientists may be tempted to stretch their judgement in a 
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favourable direction when confronted with the problem of authorship attribution (which entails 
only a reputational reward), and in the opposite direction when deciding upon inventorship (which 
may also lead to more tangible economic benefits). In doing so, senior authors may also be 
affected by a tendency to overvalue their own contribution to patents, a tendency which a 
questionnaire survey by Jaffe et al. (2000) has shown to be quite common (McSherry 2003).  
The practicalities of inventorship attribution also leave much room for mistakes and abuses. Very 
much like journal editors, patent office examiners trust entirely the identification of legitimate 
inventors to the individuals who submit their applications. At most, signed declarations are 
required. If not challenged in court (either by some excluded individuals, or by some included 
ones, who contest the unfair inclusion of others) these initial attributions remain un-scrutinized: 
patent offices, in fact, pay attention only to the technical contents of the patents they are called to 
judge, and not to the people behind them. It is doubtful that a junior scientist, excluded from a 
patent (but possibly rewarded with authorship), will find it convenient to sue a senior colleague, 
upon whom her career prospects may depend heavily.  
2.3 Authorship and inventorship: two sides of the same coin? 
Summing up the previous discussion, we may expect that when a team of scientists achieve a 
research result which is susceptible of both patenting and publishing, the number of authors of 
the publication(s) will be higher than the number of inventors listed on the related patent(s).  In 
addition, we can hypothesise that the exclusion of some authors from inventorship will possibly 
depend on a combination of legal reasons and on a within-the team negotiation process 
concerning the overall distribution of attribution rights (for a formal treatment see Lissoni et al., 
2013). 
In particular, we can sketch four different categories of authors at risk of being “excluded” from 
inventorship: 
I. Senior scientists whose contribution to the research enterprise has been largely of an 
entrepreneurial kind, so that they qualify for authorship (according to journals’ guidelines) but 
not for inventorship (according to the rule of law); 
II. Laboratory technicians and other assistant figures (including graduate students and junior 
scientists in charge of minor tasks), whose contribution qualifies them for authorship, but not 
for inventorship; 
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III. Laboratory technicians and other assistant figures (including graduate students and junior 
scientists in charge of minor tasks), who have been rewarded with “gift” authorship, and 
senior scientists honoured with “guest” authorship (none of whom, of course, qualify as 
inventors) 
IV. Junior and female scientists who qualify both for authorship and inventorship, but are 
excluded from the latter as a consequence of a team’s decision based on non contribution-
based criteria. Notice that this case is compatible with the some apparently contradictory 
evidence from the literature. For example, it has been found that senior scientists may grant 
first authorship or, less commonly, cede authorship altogether to junior colleagues for whom 
they act as mentors (Zuckerman, 1968; Haussler and Sauermann, 2013). This does not exclude 
that, on a companion patent, they will keep inventorship for themselves, possibly as a 
compensation for having given up on (first) authorship3. This possibility is reinforced by the 
fact that, for a young or female academician, whose academic status is weaker than that of 
senior and male colleagues. Authorship may be more valuable than inventorship, so that they 
may agree (more or less explicitly) on giving up inventorship in exchange of (first) authorship.  
This observation is reinforced by the greater difficulties a young or a female scientist may face 
when trying to enter markets for technologies (Murray and Graham, 2007; Whittington and 
Smith-Doerr, 2008). 
Of course these four categories do not describe all possible situations and there will always be 
cases that are difficult to place into any one of these categories. Nevertheless, in what follows we 
will review several studies which make use of bibliometric information in order to assess the 
relative importance of these four causes of an author’s exclusion from a patent.  
3. Inventorship attribution in academia: recent evidence 
The growing importance of academic patenting has raised a number of questions on the criteria 
followed by university scientists in distributing inventorship rights within research teams. Two 
lines of research have been developed so far, one that addresses directly the issue of inventorship 
attribution in academic research teams, the other that compares the attribution norms used by 
academic scientists in publications (authorship) as opposed to patents (inventorship). 
3 Notice that this does not exclude that, in other occasion (such as when a paper may earn them a scientific prize or 
other forms of outstanding recognition), the same senior scientist will keep (first) authorship for themselves 
(Zuckerman, 1968). 
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3.1 Faculty’s vs. non-faculty’s inventorship at Stanford University 
In a study of technology transfer at Stanford University, Colyvas (2007) shows how practices of 
inventorship attribution among senior life scientists at that university changed over time and 
across teams, in order to reflect strategic concerns. According to Colyvas, a study of archival data 
on patent disclosures suggests at least four models of patenting behaviour and inventorship 
attribution: 
1. “Team effort”. In this model, which dates back to the early days of technology transfer from 
the life science, the invention disclosure was not signed by the principal investigator. In fact, 
most disclosures referred not to biological materials, but to the experimental devices built by 
technicians. Also for this reason, inventorship attribution was not regarded as bringing 
reputation within the scientific community (that is, it did not produce any scientific credit) 
2. “Clear boundaries”. In this model, inventorship is attributed first and foremost to the scientist 
(principal investigator) who came up with the idea. Most often, no technical staff was included 
among the inventors. This was (and is) especially applied to inventions covering consumer 
applications from which the principal investigator wishes not so much to earn a profit, but 
scientific credit through widespread (unrestricted) application. By excluding other research 
team members from the patent, the principal investigator retains as much control as possible 
over licensing practices and development. 
3. “Non-faculty career”. In this model patenting is seen as a reputational asset for non-faculty 
careers, inside or outside universities, to be left entirely with technicians and laboratory 
engineers, and not appropriated by academic scientists 
4. “Fair share”. In this model, which has seen increasing diffusion over time, the patented 
invention relates directly to the results of basic research, and all the research team members 
are seen as entitled to the economic and reputational benefits that may derive from it (notice 
that, given the patent matter, inventorship attribution brings scientific credit).  
Colyvas and Powell (2008) have produced some quantitative evidence on the distribution of 
inventorship credits between faculty and technical staff at Stanford over the years, which resulted 
from the relative importance given to the four models. They find that the faculty’s inventorship 
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share (measured as the percentage of inventors listed on the patent disclosures filed at Stanford 
technology transfer office) has risen from around 30% in the 1970s to almost 50% in the 1990s, 
while the laboratory  technicians’ share has collapsed from 46% to 11% over the same years (the 
other shares being those of students and scientists from other universities or from companies). 
Overall, these results suggest that inventorship distribution in university settings does not descend 
uncontroversially from the legal definition of inventor, but from complex attribution criteria 
depending on the contents of the patented invention, the changing attitude towards inventorship 
as a reputational reward in the scientific community, and social norms regarding fairness and due 
concern for the technicians’ careers. 
3.2 Authorship-inventorship in patent-publication pairs 
Scientific papers and patents differ widely in contents, since scientific publications describe a set 
of theories and/or experimental results, of which they emphasize the originality and neatness 
according to some rhetorical rules, while patents describe the features of a new product or 
process, of which they emphasize the novelty and utility by laying out a list of claims. However, in 
so-called “science-based” technologies and in engineering, it is often the case that a patentable 
advancement is also worth of publication in refereed journals. In this case, we may expect highly 
specific words to be present both in the patent and in the publications that report on the 
advancement. As a consequence, text analysis of patents and publications sharing at least one 
inventor/author may be revealing of the existence of some patent-publication pairs (PPPs).  
A patent and a paper form a pair when the same idea is described to some extent in both 
documents, and at least one author and one inventor are the same person. This happens when a 
new scientific idea coincides with a solution to a technical problem and has some degree of 
industrial applicability. However, it may be that the two sets of authors and inventors differ, as 
when some authors of the paper are not listed among the inventors or vice versa. Measuring the 
extent and the reasons of such differences may cast light on the determinants of both authorship 
and inventorship attribution4.  
4 The PPP methodology has also been applied  to investigate the anti-commons effect of academic patenting. In 
particolar, Murray and Stern (2007 and 2008) compare 340 articles published in Nature Biotechnology between 1997 
and 1999 with their authors’ patents at the USPTO, ending up with 169 PPPs, all of them selected through careful 
reading of both types of documents. A previous study by Murray (2002) concerned a single patent-paper pair on tissue 
engineering in cartilage, which served as a case study on the co-evolution of scientific and technological networks. 
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The first paper based upon the PPP methodology was Ducor’s (2000), who performed a manual 
search of various databases for proteins with specific genetic or aminoacid sequences, finding 40 
pairs. in all but two of cases, Ducor’s PPPs have more authors than inventors, with average figures 
respectively equal to 10 and 3. Ducor also finds that the position of an author in the by-line of the 
paper is indicative of the risk of exclusion from the patent run by the same author, with being the 
least at risk, followed by first ones. As an explanation for his findings, Ducor indicates the abuse of 
guest/gift authorship practices as well as the possibility of arbitrary exclusions from inventorship.  
In Lissoni et al. (2013), we build upon Ducor’s PPP methodology, but substitute the manual search 
procedure with an automated text-mining technique, with the aim of building a large sample, 
representative of different scientific fields.  We focus on Italian academic inventors from the KEINS 
database (see Lissoni et al., 2006 and 2007), from the four disciplinary fields with the highest share 
of academic inventors over the total number of professors in the field; namely: Chemical 
Engineering (which includes technology of materials, such as macromolecular compounds), 
Biology, Pharmacology, and Electronics & Telecommunications, for a total of 308 academic 
inventors and 552 patents (see also Breschi et al. 2005, 2007). PPPs were then obtained by 
matching publication data from the ISI Science Citation Index for such academic inventors to their 
patents, on the basis of a comparison of the titles and abstracts of patents and publications 
through a variety of “co-word analysis” techniques (Leopold et al. 2004; Bassecoulard and Zitt, 
2004). Time restrictions were also applied, so that no publication was selected for the matching 
exercise, which appeared in a journal more than two years before/after the priority date of the 
patent. 
Table 2 shows that the average number of inventors per PPPs is on average between 3 and 4, 
while the number of authors is significantly higher (around 5). These results are indicative of the 
existence of a process of exclusion. They also suggest the existence of significant differences 
across disciplines, the average difference between the number of authors and the number of 
inventors being significantly higher than zero only in Biology and Pharmacology. In Chemical 
Engineering and Material Technology and Electronics & Telecommunications the average number 
of authors and inventors are roughly the same, and the median value of the difference across PPPs 
is equal to 0.  
Table 2: Difference between number of authors and inventors in PPPs, by disciplines 
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 Average 
nr. of 
authors 
MIN/MAX 
nr. of 
authors 
Average 
nr. of 
invento
rs 
MIN/MA
X nr. of 
inventors 
 authors- 
inventors 
(avg 
value)(a) 
MIN/MAX 
 authors- 
inventors 
(a) 
 authors- 
inventors 
(median)(a) 
Pharmacology 6,47 2/14 3,75 1/10 2,71 -5/12 2 
Biology 6,32 2/42 3,60 1/21 2,72 -18/37 3 
Chemical Eng. 
& Materials 
Tech. 
4,54 1/8 4,67 2/11 -0,13 -4/5 0 
Electronics 
and Telecom 3,63 1/19 2,99 1/6 0,63 -3/16 0 
ALL 5,00 1/42 3,36 1/21 1,64 -18/37 1 
(a) These columns refers to average min max and median value of the difference between the nr. of 
authors and inventors in each PPP 
Source: elaborations from Lissoni et al. (2013) 
As for patterns of exclusion, these were examined by focussing only on PPPs wherein the authors 
of the publications were not listed in alphabetical order, and by adding to the available 
information on individual authors their stock number of publications at the date of the patent, and 
the year of appearance of their first publication, both derived from the ISI Science Citation Index. 
While an author’s stock of publication can be taken as indicative of her academic status, the time 
elapsed between the patent date and the year of first publication is a proxy of the author’s 
seniority. 
With these data in hands, we then proceeded to estimate the “risk of exclusion” of an author of a 
publication in a PPP from the patents included in the same PPP, as function of the position of the 
author in the publication by-line (first or last vs. middle positions), her seniority , gender and a 
number of controls such as the time distance between the patents and the publications in the PPP 
(as a proxy of overlapping between the two), as well as field, time, and journal dummies.  
We found that both first and last authors have a significantly lower probability to be excluded 
from inventorship than middle authors. Contrary to Ducor, we find that first authors’ probability of 
exclusion is lower than last authors’. We also find that the probability of exclusion is significantly 
lower the higher the author’s seniority. In particular, a ten year increase in seniority decreases the 
probability of exclusion of a first authors by approximately 0.16, and by approximately 0.13 for a 
last author. This is in line with the view of first authors as those who contribute more, and more 
creatively, to the publication. It is also in line with the view that the last authors have contributed 
to the publication more than the middle authors. However, the contribution is lower than that of 
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first authors, a fact which is reflected in their comparatively higher probability of exclusion from 
the patent. Thus, seniority gives some bargaining power that allows any author to be granted 
inventorship even if he or she contributed less. Put differently: given the same contribution to the 
publication, a junior scientist is more at risk of being excluded from the patent.  
We interpret these results as a confirmation that inventorship attribution cannot be entirely 
explained by a scientist’s contribution to a research project, as it should be according to the rule of 
law. Seniority matters, in the sense that junior colleagues are more at risk of exclusion even when 
they contribute the same as the senior ones. Room for abuse and litigation is likely to exist, as first 
suggested by Ducor (2000). At the same time, the frequent exclusion from inventorship of authors 
listed in between the first and last position of a publication by-line provides one more hint at the 
possible existence of widespread practices of guest and gift attribution, as discussed above. 
More recently, Häussler and Sauermann (2013) for a sample of British and German life scientists, 
do not find any evidence of a relationship between the distribution of attribution rights and 
gender, while finding some for seniority. They also compare the behaviour of industry scientists to 
that of academics, and find no substantial differences. 
4. Conclusions  
In this paper, we have discussed and then explored the determinants of inventorship attribution in 
academic patents, and compared them to those of authorship attribution. Our results are both of 
practical and of theoretical interest. They reinforce mounting doubts on the efficiency of current 
reputational systems in science, especially in the medical field. They also send a word of caution to 
all policy makers who are currently pushing for linking the distribution of research funds to 
automated or quasi-automated bibliometric assessments of scientific productivity, since such 
exercises rely too heavily on the questionable concept of authorship for being accepted as sensible 
solutions to the complexity of the economics of science. 
 Facing the changing realities of scientific conduct, the increased range of activities that 
contributes to successful discoveries create tensions and paradoxes within laboratories and 
research groups (Laudel, 2002; Hackett, 2005). Larger research groups challenge not only the 
current notion of authorship but all the standards used for credit allocation and personnel 
evaluation. We believe that an in-depth discussion of mechanisms such as contributorship, 
stronger rules in terms of acknowledgement and more explicit guidelines or ethical codes would 
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help to improve the allocation of scientific credit and the efficiency of the labour market of 
scientists.  
On the theoretical side, the literature we surveyed contributes to the criticism of the economic 
and social value of the concept of authorship, and extends it to that of inventorship. With the 
transformation of science into a collective enterprise, a loss of correspondence between individual 
papers and authors has arisen, so that the concept of authorship has become increasingly 
problematic. Far from being self-evident, authorship is the result of a complex web of social and 
legal conventions, some of them dating back to XVIII century, when scientists had to carve a role 
for themselves in society, and were keen on building a public image of the researcher as an heroic 
individual (McSherry, 2001; Galison, 2003). While academic science still cherishes the idea that the 
scientific discovery is the result of an individual’s spark of genius, other fields of human creativity 
have abandoned that idea (Fisk, 2006). In fields such as movie-making, for example, it is taken for 
granted that a division of labour exists between the various professional figures, so that 
specialized credits are awarded to each of them (directors, screenwriter, choreographers, sound 
makers….); at the same time, some ranking within the same professional categories is allowed 
(director, assistant director....). As mentioned in section 2.1, some steps in the same direction 
have been undertaken by a few scientific journals (e.g. JAMA, The Lancet, British Medical Journal 
and Radiology), which now require contributors not merely to identify themselves as “authors”, 
but also to specify the exact contents of their contribution (see Table 1). Social and economic 
conventions in science, however, have not yet fully incorporated and elaborated upon this 
tendency. 
Patent laws may run into the same type of problems with the concept of inventorship. The legal 
figure of the inventor may also be an obsolete one, that dates back to a time – the XIX century - 
when the existence of patents had been put into question, and was defended by the creation of a 
public image of inventors as “heroes of the industrial revolution” and individuals whose rights 
ought to be defended (Machlup and Penrose, 1950; Long, 1991; Bracha, 2005; MacLeod, 2008). 
Recent critical revisions of the “myth of the sole inventor” have produced much historical 
evidence on: (i) the pervasive phenomenon of invention simultaneity (which occur when several 
inventors achieve independently the same result); and (ii) the importance of “collective 
innovation” processes, in which technologists and entrepreneurs give up patenting (or patent 
enforcing) and mutually disclose the details of their inventions in order to speed up cumulative 
technological change (Bessen and Nuvolari, 2011; Lemley, 2012). Such evidence question the 
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existing legal and economic rationales for the existence of the patent system, or at least for any 
call to strengthen it.  
Our analysis suggests that, even in the absence of invention simultaneity or free sharing of 
knowledge, inventive activities, very much like scientific research ones, are increasingly based on 
division and specialization labour. While this observation may not challenge the overall rationale 
for patents, it calls into question the economic efficiency of the inventor concept. Inventive 
activity is the result of a large number of tasks that are distributed among several individuals in a 
team. In the absence of a specific recognition of the value of these tasks, team members may have 
too much latitude in negotiating how to share credit. Besides leading to possible abuses against 
weaker team members, this latitude results in diffusing inaccurate or too vague information on 
the professional skills of inventors. In this respect, inventorship is plagued by the same problems 
that have long ago recognized to affect scientific authorship. The same steps taken to replace the 
latter with contributorship should be taken, with evaluation agencies taking an active role in 
promoting them. 
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